As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

In this paper, we contribute to both theoretical analyses.

We consider the classical problem of finding the minimum feedback arc set on tournaments (MFAST). The problem is NP-hard in general and we study it for important classes of tournaments that arise naturally in the problem of learning to rank from pairwise comparisons. Specifically, we consider tournaments classes that arise out of parametric preference matrices that can lead to cyclic preference relations. We investigate their structural properties via forbidden sub tournament configurations. Towards this, we introduce \emph{Tournament Dimension} - a combinatorial parameter that characterizes the size of a forbidden configuration for rank $r$ tournament classes i.e., classes that arise out pairwise preference matrices which lead to rank $r$ skew-symmetric matrices under a suitable link function.

Pairwise comparison methods, such as Fuzzy Preference Relations and Saaty's Multiplicative Preference Relations, are widely used to model expert judgments in multi-criteria decision-making. However, their application is limited by the high cognitive load required to complete $m(m-1)/2$ comparisons, the risk of inconsistency, and the computational complexity of deriving consistent value scales. This paper proposes the Tournament Tree Method (TTM), a novel elicitation and evaluation framework that overcomes these limitations. The TTM requires only $m-1$ pairwise comparisons to obtain a complete, reciprocal, and consistent comparison matrix. The method consists of three phases: (i) elicitation of expert judgments using a reduced set of targeted comparisons, (ii) construction of the consistent pairwise comparison matrix, and (iii) derivation of a global value scale from the resulting matrix. The proposed approach ensures consistency by design, minimizes cognitive effort, and reduces the dimensionality of preference modeling from $m(m-1)/2$ to $m$ parameters. Furthermore, it is compatible with the classical Deck of Cards method, and thus it can handle interval and ratio scales. We have also developed a web-based tool that demonstrates its practical applicability in real decision-making scenarios.

A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $α$ (contraction) and $γ$ (expansion). Within the context of \emph{social} choice, however, rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow's is the most prominent. Since choice functions select \emph{sets} of alternatives rather than single alternatives, we propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets (set-rationalizability). We also introduce two consistency conditions, $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$, which are defined in analogy to $α$ and $γ$, and find that a choice function is set-rationalizable if and only if it satisfies $\hatα$. Moreover, a choice function satisfies $\hatα$ and $\hatγ$ if and only if it is \emph{self-stable}, a new concept based on earlier work by \citeauthor{Dutt88a}. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions such as the minimal covering set and the essential set.

This paper presents a comprehensive formalization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility theorem using the Lean 4 interactive theorem prover. We implement the classical axioms of preference-completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence-enabling machine-verified proofs of both the existence and uniqueness of utility representations. Our formalization captures the mathematical structure of preference relations over lotteries, verifying that preferences satisfying the vNM axioms can be represented by expected utility maximization. Our contributions include a granular implementation of the independence axiom, formally verified proofs of fundamental claims about mixture lotteries, constructive demonstrations of utility existence, and computational experiments validating the results. We prove equivalence to classical presentations while offering greater precision at decision boundaries. This formalization provides a rigorous foundation for applications in economic modeling, AI alignment, and management decision systems, bridging the gap between theoretical decision theory and computational implementation.